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Review
There is a rich and fascinating history of discoveries about 
the angular gyrus (AG). From a devastating effect on word 
processing when the left AG is damaged (Dejerine 1891) to 
triggering an out-of-body experience when the right AG is 
electrically stimulated (Blanke and others 2002), the AG 
has not yet revealed all its secrets and is still attracting a 
huge interest in the neuroscience community. A search on 
PubMed using angular gyrus as a keyword limited to the 
“title/abstract” retrieved nearly 500 studies. This brief 
review aims to integrate previous findings about the AG, 
particularly regarding its potential role(s) and whether it can 
be subdivided into multiple areas. The studies reviewed 
here are limited to functional studies of healthy populations 
irrespective of task or topic of interest. Given the huge 
number of functional neuroimaging studies that reported 
interesting effects in the AG, it was not possible to evaluate 
all their findings thoroughly. Therefore, the focus here is 
made on consistent results rather than the differences 
between previous studies. Specifically, effects of interest 
are limited to the functions and processes that have been 
shown with a compelling consistency in previous meta-
analysis reviews. Because of space limitations, a large pro-
portion of selective citations are made here of reviews with 
the expectation that each of these reviews would provide a 
comprehensive list of previous studies that reported activa-
tion in the AG in different tasks and contexts.
This review is divided into three sections. A first sec-
tion provides some useful definitions about the anatomy 
of the AG. The second section reviews the different roles 
and functions that have been associated with the AG. The 
third section succinctly presents some of the emerging 
evidence of multiple subdivisions within the AG.
The Anatomy of the AG
Localization in the Posterior  
Inferior Parietal Lobule
The AG occupies a posterior part of the inferior parietal 
lobule corresponding to Brodmann area (BA) 39, von 
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Abstract
There is considerable interest in the structural and functional properties of the angular gyrus (AG). Located in 
the posterior part of the inferior parietal lobule, the AG has been shown in numerous meta-analysis reviews to be 
consistently activated in a variety of tasks. This review discusses the involvement of the AG in semantic processing, 
word reading and comprehension, number processing, default mode network, memory retrieval, attention and spatial 
cognition, reasoning, and social cognition. This large functional neuroimaging literature depicts a major role for the AG 
in processing concepts rather than percepts when interfacing perception-to-recognition-to-action. More specifically, 
the AG emerges as a cross-modal hub where converging multisensory information is combined and integrated to 
comprehend and give sense to events, manipulate mental representations, solve familiar problems, and reorient 
attention to relevant information. In addition, this review discusses recent findings that point to the existence of 
multiple subdivisions in the AG. This spatial parcellation can serve as a framework for reporting AG activations with 
greater definition. This review also acknowledges that the role of the AG cannot comprehensibly be identified in 
isolation but needs to be understood in parallel with the influence from other regions. Several interesting questions 
that warrant further investigations are finally emphasized.
Keywords
inferior parietal lobule, connectivity, cross-modal integration, semantic, default network
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Economo and Koskinas area PG, or area 69 in the unified 
nomenclature of Triarhou (2007). It can be seen as the 
continuation of the superior/middle temporal gyri into 
the inferior parietal lobule with a medial boundary 
defined by the intraparietal sulcus (Rademacher and oth-
ers 1992). Its anterior boundary with the supramarginal 
gyrus is marked by the descending portion of the inter-
mediate sulcus of Jensen (Ribas 2010), and its posterior 
boundary is set by the dorsal part of the anterior occipital 
sulcus (Rademacher and others 1992). On a sagittal view, 
it can easily be identified by its horseshoe shape near the 
dorsal-posterior segment of the superior temporal sulcus 
that is also called the angular sulcus (Naidich and others 
1995) (see Fig. 1). Recent cytoarchitectonic studies (e.g., 
Caspers and others 2008; Caspers and others 2006) have 
suggested that the AG extends rostrally to area PGa and 
caudally to area PGp, as illustrated in Figure 1C. Its cor-
tical volume is estimated at around 13.2 cm3 and 11.7 
cm3 in the left and right hemisphere, respectively 
(Rademacher and others 1992), suggesting a relative left-
greater-than-right structural asymmetry (see also 
Eidelberg and Galaburda 1984). It is worth noting that 
the AG belongs to a set of parietal regions that are lightly 
myelinated compared with sensory or modality-specific 
regions (Box 1). Last but not least, an increasing literature 
points to an extensive training-induced structural plastic-
ity in bilateral AG in the adult brain, particularly when 
learning new skills that require spatial coordination and 
verbal memory (see summary in Box 2).
Structural Connectivity
With its location at the junction between the occipital, 
temporal, and parietal lobes, the AG is considered an 
important interface that conveys and integrates informa-
tion between different modalities and processing subsys-
tems. For instance, large-scale connectivity analyses 
have shown that the AG is one of the major connector 
hubs linking different subsystems (Hagmann and others 
2008; Tomasi and Volkow 2011). It is thus essential to 
identify the set of regions that anatomically connect to 
the AG as this would shed some light on its role during 
different cognitive processes. Because of the lack of con-
sensus about the exact homology of the AG between 
humans and monkeys, it was not possible to discuss here 
the rich literature of anatomical tracer studies in the non-
human primate (see Box 3). Thanks to recent advances in 
diffusion tensor imaging and tractography techniques, 
noninvasive visualization of white matter tracts that link 
the AG to other brain structures has been made possible 
Figure 1. (A) Localization of the angular gyrus (Brodmann area [BA] 39) with respect to some anatomical landmarks that are 
close to the angular gyrus (AG), illustrated on a lateral view of a single subject brain. Numbers correspond to BA 7, 19, 21, 
22, 37, 39, and 40. STS = superior temporal sulcus; MTS = middle temporal sulcus; IPS = intraparietal sulcus; LS(SF) = lateral 
sulcus (sylvian fissure); PCS = postcentral sulcus; POS = parieto-occipital sulcus; TOS = transverse occipital sulcus; AS = angular 
sulcus; ISJ = intermediate sulcus of Jensen. Projection of the AG from two widely used anatomical toolboxes in region-based 
analyses in functional neuroimaging, including (B) the AAL atlas (http://www.cyceron.fr/web/aal_anatomical_automatic_labeling.
html) and (C) the probabilistic anatomy toolbox (http://www.fz-juelich.de/inm/inm-1/EN/Home/home_node.html) showing two 
cytoarchitectonic areas PGa (cyan) and PGp (red), as detailed in Caspers and others (2008).
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(e.g., Catani and Thiebaut de Schotten 2008; Oishi and 
others 2008; Wakana and others 2004). Below is a list of 
some major tracts and bundles from previous diffusion 
tensor imaging studies that defined the AG as a seed, a 
target, or an intermediate connecting region in their trac-
tography analyses. These different tracts are mentioned 
here using the same labels as in the original studies and 
are schematically illustrated in Figure 2.
Left and right AG are interconnected via the dorsal areas 
of the splenium and isthmus of the corpus callosum (Park 
and others 2008). The AG connects to the ipsilateral frontal 
and opercular areas via the superior longitudinal fasciculus 
(SLF) (Makris and others 2005). Specifically, the second 
branch of the SLF (SLF-II), located at the central core of the 
white matter above the insula, connects the AG to the caudal- 
lateral prefrontal regions (Makris and others 2005), and the 
third branch (SLF-III) links the AG directly to the inferior 
frontal gyrus (Broca area) at the level of areas BA 44 (Frey 
and others 2008) and BA 45 (Kelly and others 2010). It is 
also connected to the caudal posterior temporal regions via 
the middle longitudinal fasciculus (Frey and others 2008; 
Makris and others 2009) and to other temporal regions via 
the posterior segment of the arcuate fasciculus (Catani and 
others 2005). The AG also connects to the precuneus (BA 7) 
and the superior frontal gyrus (BA 8) via the occipitofrontal 
fasciculus (Makris and others 2007), to the caudate via the 
inferior occipitofrontal fasciculus (Uddin and others 2010), 
and to both parahippocampal gyrus (Rushworth and others 
2006) and hippocampus (Uddin and others 2010) via the 
inferior longitudinal fascicle. Regarding its connections 
within the inferior parietal lobule, the AG connects to a pos-
terior part of the supramarginal gyrus via local arcuate 
(U-shaped) connections (Lee and others 2007). Last but not 
least, it is argued that the AG receives little or no direct input 
from primary sensory areas (see discussion in Binder and 
others 2009). This rich anatomical connectivity pattern 
(Figure 2) enables considerable interactivity between the 
AG and temporofrontal subsystems in addition to other 
medial regions such as the hippocampus, caudate, and pre-
cuneus. As detailed below, connectivity may vary with the 
AG subregion used in seed-based tractography analyses (see 
examples in Mars and others 2011; Uddin and others 2010).
Box 1. AG Maturation
Myelin content and maturational curves constitute some of the key anatomical properties that shape regional parcellation 
and function. In the inferior parietal lobule, it has been shown that gyration starts by 27 weeks post–gestational age, and the 
cortical folding of intraparietal and parieto-occipital sulci that anatomically delineate the AG may progress from 27 to 31 weeks 
gestational age (Dubois and others 2008). This early morphometric development may explain why the AG has been activated in 
previous studies in very young subjects; for instance, three-month-old infants showed strong fMRI activations in the left AG for 
normal mother’s voice speech compared with reversed speech (Dehaene-Lambertz and others 2002). Early studies (as reviewed 
in Geschwind 1965) suggested very late myelination in bilateral AG (e.g., Flechsig’s myelination map; see Figure 14 in Glasser and 
Van Essen 2011), being probably the latest in the whole parietal lobe. However, recent studies have observed earlier myelination 
than initially thought. For instance, across childhood, gray matter maturation in the AG peaks between 8.5 (Gogtay and others 
2004) and 13 years (Westlye and others 2010) and then declines with age. The topology of the AG in terms of anatomical 
parcellation and boundaries is already well established in school-age children (Barnes and others 2011). In adults, it has been 
shown that the whole inferior parietal cortex, including the AG, is lightly myelinated compared with primary and secondary 
sensory regions (Glasser and Van Essen 2011).
Box 2. Structural Plasticity
There is increasing evidence about a training-induced neuroanatomic plasticity even in the adult brain that results in detectable 
structural changes following learning new skills (for review, see Draganski and May 2008). These structural changes can occur 
at the macroscopic level and thus can be revealed by morphometry analyses on high-resolution anatomical scans. Interestingly, 
several studies have reported structural changes in the AG during learning. For instance, when brain scans were compared in 
subjects before and after training to juggle, increased gray matter density was detected in the left AG and bilateral mid-temporal 
regions (Draganski and others 2004), probably reflecting an increase in the coordination and storage of complex visual motion. 
In the language domain, a comparison between bilinguals and monolinguals revealed stronger gray matter density in the bilingual 
brain in the anterior AG that also correlated significantly with the second-language proficiency (Mechelli and others 2004). 
In addition, gray matter density in bilateral AG was shown to be significantly higher in subjects who learned to read as adults 
(late literates) compared with a matched group of adult illiterates (Carreiras and others 2009). Recently, by measuring creative 
productivity scores across different skills that included visual arts, music, creative writing, scientific discovery, and invention, a 
whole-brain correlation between cortical thickness and creativity scores was only significant in the AG (Jung and others 2010). 
This literature points to a phenomenal structural plasticity in the AG when subjects are learning new skills that tap on spatial 
coordination, verbal storage, and creativity.
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Box 3. Homology with the Nonhuman Primate Brain
An interesting observation from previous comparative studies is the striking differences in location and size of the inferior 
parietal cortex between humans and animals (Hyvarinen 1982; Orban and others 2006). For instance, previous reports have 
suggested that there is no clear homologue in monkeys to the human AG (Geschwind 1965; Zilles and Palomero-Gallagher 
2001; see illustration in Figure 1 of Culham and Kanwisher 2001). This is largely because expansion of the posterior parietal 
lobe in humans has taken place largely in the inferior parietal lobule and in particular in the AG (Hyvarinen 1982). A few studies, 
however, have tentatively proposed a homology between the AG and areas 7a/PG of the macaque brain (McCulloch 1944; 
Petrides and Pandya 2009). Orban and others (2004) argued that the intraparietal sulcus in monkeys may correspond not only to 
the intraparietal sulcus in humans but also to a part of the AG (cf. Figure 2 of Orban and others 2004). Furthermore, anatomical 
tracer studies in the monkey have revealed rich efferent and afferent connections between the different subareas of the posterior 
parietal cortex with multiple inferior frontal, dorsal prefrontal, parahippocampal, hippocampal, and thalamic, caudate, cingulate, 
superior temporal, and frontal eye field (e.g., Andersen and others 1990; Cavada and Goldman-Rakic 1989; Pandya and Seltzer 
1982; Petrides and Pandya 2009). However, because a homology between the human AG and its counterpart in the nonhuman 
primate is still a matter of debate, it is unclear to what extent this rich literature of monkey anatomical tracer studies can be 
compared with connectivity studies of the human brain (for a similar rationale, see Uddin and others 2010).
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of some white matter tracts mapped in previous studies that used diffusion tensor imaging 
and tractography analysis. It is, however, important to keep in mind some of the limitations in using such techniques to quantify 
structural connectivity in vivo (see review in Jones 2010; Jones and Cercignani 2010). For ease of illustration, the tracts are 
oversimplified (i.e., not shown at their exact extent and localization). The names of the tracts are kept identical to the ones used 
in the original studies. The exact localization and full extent of each tract can be retrieved from their original studies as explicitly 
listed below: SLF-II = superior longitudinal fasciculus–second branch (cf. Figure 3 of Makris and others 2005); SLF-III = superior 
longitudinal fasciculus–third branch (cf. Figure 8 of Frey and others 2008); MLF = middle longitudinal fasciculus (cf. Figures 5–7 
of Makris and others 2009, Figure 7 of Frey and others 2008); ILF = the inferior longitudinal fascicle (cf. Figure 5 of Rushworth 
and others 2006); OFF = occipitofrontal fascicle (cf. Figure 8 of Makris and others 2007); IOFF = inferior occipitofrontal fascicle 
(cf. Figure 5 of Uddin and others 2010). OFF and IOFF may correspond to the same tract (see discussion in Makris and others 
2007), although other studies have suggested the existence of both inferior and superior OFF in humans. BA = Brodmann area; 
AG = angular gyrus; SOG = superior occipital gyrus; Pcu = precuneus; pSMG = posterior supramarginal gyrus; MTG/ITG = middle 
temporal gyrus/inferior temporal gyrus; HP/PHG = hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; MFG = middle 
frontal gyrus; SFG = superior frontal gyrus.
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Table 1. Meta-Analysis Studies That Identified Consistent Angular Gyrus (AG) Activation across Numerous Functional 
Neuroimaging Studies (Listed Alphabetically: First Author + Year)
Task/Process Left AG Right AG
Arsalidou 2011 Visuospatial facts retrieval in calculations — 30 –58 32a
Dehaene 2003 Verbal retrieval of numbers –41 –66 36 —
Kim 2010 Memory retrieval: self-referential processing –40 –74 24 —
 Memory retrieval: control processing — 42 –60 26
Laird 2009 Default mode network –42 –66 18 46 –66 16
Mar 2011 Story-based theory-of-mind –42 –72 34 54 –54 26
 Non-story-based theory-of-mind –46 –62 32 52 –54 34
Mazoyer 2001 Default mode network –52 –74 18 46 –68 26
Nee 2007 Conflict resolution in go/no-go tasks — 42 –64 32
Shulman 1997 Default mode network –45 –67 36 —
Spaniol 2009 Episodic memory: retrieval success –34 –60 44a 46 –50 28
 Episodic memory: subjective recollection –40 –72 32 52 –68 16
Sperduti 2011 External-agency attribution –50 –56 44 58 –56 36
Spreng 2009 Default mode network –43 –69 32 49 –63 20
 Autobiographical memory –47 –61 26 49 –59 27
 Visuospatial navigation –34 –78 34 42 –74 32
 Theory-of-mind –43 –68 39 —
 Prospection –49 –64 29 —
Turkeltaub 2010 Phoneme discrimination –38 –60 42a —
Vigneau 2006 Semantic processing –45 –68 26 —
Vilberg 2008 Memory retrieval: successful recollection –43 –66 38 53 –61 25
Wager 2005 Inhibition in go/no-go tasks — 41 –64 35
Wang 2010 Concrete versus abstract concepts –34 –76 34 —
— = AG not identified. 
aThe coordinates of these dorsal-medial clusters may extend to other parietal subareas of the intraparietal sulcus (see Caspers and others 2008).
Multiple Functions
Functionally, the AG is commonly considered part of the 
heteromodal parietal association cortex (Rademacher and 
others 1992). At the system level, it is one of the major con-
necting hubs, as shown in previous functional connectivity 
studies (e.g., Tomasi and Volkow 2011). An abundant litera-
ture on healthy adult populations revealed that both left and 
right AG are implicated in numerous tasks and processes. 
For instance, using the NeuroSythn database (Yarkoni and 
others 2011), a “reverse inference” at coordinates [x = –48, 
y = –56, z = 36] revealed that several concepts and keywords 
previously have been associated with the left AG in numer-
ous fMRI and PET studies, with the top 10 concepts includ-
ing retrieval, default mode network, memory, semantic, 
sentence, semantic memory, consciousness, narrative, inten-
tional, and familiar. This section succinctly reviews some of 
the most common functions associated with the AG on the 
basis that these functions consistently implicated the AG 
across numerous studies, as demonstrated from previous 
meta-analysis reviews. As a selection criterion, the AG 
should at least be listed in the meta-analysis tables of previ-
ous reviews. Each function is briefly introduced in separate 
paragraphs below. Table 1 provides some of the most con-
sistent coordinates for the AG in different tasks from previ-
ous meta-analysis reviews.
But first it is important to keep in mind some concep-
tual issues and limitations on the kind of inferences that 
someone can make from previous literature (see Box 4 
for more details). For instance, it is worth noting the dis-
crepancy in previous studies and reviews when it comes 
to labeling their AG foci using sometimes different names 
for the same localization. The nomenclature of region 
thus tends to vary depending on the cognitive domain 
under study. For example, activation in the AG is more 
often described as (or part of) the temporoparietal 
junction in social cognition. In the language and reading 
literature, the labels posterior middle temporal gyrus and 
temporo-parieto-occipital cortex are sometimes used. 
Other studies, particularly in the domain of attention, 
default mode, number processing, and memory, have 
used unspecific labels such as inferior parietal lobule, 
posterior parietal cortex, or ventral parietal cortex to 
designate their AG activation, as these labels mix AG 
with other neighbor regions such as the supramarginal 
gyrus and the lateral bank of the intraparietal sulcus. In 
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particular, several distinct areas may exist along the banks 
of the intraparietal sulcus (e.g., Culham and Kanwisher 
2001; Grefkes and Fink 2005; Konen and Kastner 2008), 
and thus it is important to not conflate them with the AG. 
When these labels were used, the stereotaxic coordinates 
(if provided) were compared with typical localization of 
the AG (as defined in previous atlases of Fig. 1B,C) to 
decide whether to include such activations in the review.
Semantic Processing
Semantic processing is the most consistent function 
that activates the AG, particularly in the left hemi-
sphere. Early functional imaging studies demonstrated 
left AG activation during semantic tasks on auditory 
(Demonet and others 1992) and visual (Vandenberghe 
and others 1996) stimuli, and these findings have been 
replicated with high consistency and reliability across 
numerous studies (see meta-analysis reviews in Binder 
and others 2009; Vigneau and others 2006). For 
instance, Binder and others (2009) found that the most 
consistent semantic activation across 120 functional 
neuroimaging studies was located within the left AG 
(Binder and others 2009), with a less strong but consis-
tent effect in the right AG as well. Moreover, the AG 
plays a major role in processing concrete relative to 
abstract concepts (Wang and others 2010). More spe-
cifically, the left AG seems to be engaged in all aspects 
of semantic processing that require concept retrieval 
and conceptual integration (Binder and others 2009), 
and it provides semantic constraints during language 
comprehension (Price CJ 2010; Seghier and others 
2010). As detailed below, semantics are inherently 
present in multiple tasks that activate the AG.
Reading and Comprehension
The involvement of the AG in reading comprehension 
was first suggested by Dejerine (1891), who documented 
a loss in the capacity to read and write words following 
damage to the left AG. This finding was then popularized 
by the seminal work of Geschwind (1965). In his model, 
Box 4. Methodological Issues
1.  Identifying the exact role of a given brain structure is not straightforward in the context of the many-to-many 
relationship between structure and function. In this context, the exact role of the AG critically depends on the 
set of regions it is interacting with during a given task/process. This implies that the role of the AG cannot 
comprehensibly be identified in isolation but ideally needs to be understood in parallel with the influence from 
other regions—for instance, by combining the AG with other interacting regions to enable meta-analyses at 
the system level. This kind of systemic meta-analysis may help, for instance, to identify brain regions that are 
consistently coactivated with the AG and how they interact with task demands, modality, and stimulus domain.
2.  Existing differences in functional properties and lateralization between the left and right AG have not always 
been taken into account in previous studies and reviews, although strong bilateral AG activations are not 
uncommon. Indeed, some interesting differences between the left and right AG may get “blurred” and thus 
were omitted in previous meta-analysis reviews; therefore, differences between the left and right AG are not 
strongly emphasized in this review.
3.  It is obvious to note the diversity in tasks that were previously used to activate the AG, varying in terms of 
stimulus material, domain, modality, baseline condition, response type, paradigm design, and sequence. In the 
same way, reporting activation in the AG during a given function/domain with fMRI or PET (i.e., typically by 
contrasting different conditions/tasks) does not necessarily mean that the AG was essential for that function/
domain. Here, emphasis was particularly put on consistent findings, and thus such inevitable methodological 
differences were ignored.
4.  There is a sort of “borrowing” of several concepts across different domains for the interpretation of activations 
in the AG, which inevitably resulted in the same concept being associated with different processes in com-
pletely different tasks. For instance, the use of “magnitude/size” in spatial attention and number-processing 
studies, “referential” in social cognition and the default network studies, or “semantic” in language and epi-
sodic memory studies may reflect different processes despite being described under the same concept.
5.  Previous studies and reviews have used different terms to describe the responses that are common (or indepen-
dent) to several modalities, including multimodal, heteromodal, trimodal, amodal, intermodal, cross-modal, 
polymodal, transmodal, and modality independent. Although subtle differences exist between these concepts, 
the term cross-modal is used here to stress the significant activation in the AG across several modalities.
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Geschwind (1965) defined the AG as a visual memory 
center for words that turns written language into spoken 
language and vice versa. Activation in the left AG during 
reading was found to be highly consistent in children as 
well (see meta-analysis in Houde and others 2010); how-
ever, the left AG was not sensitive to visual word forms 
because it was not activated during reading aloud single 
words relative to fixation (see discussion in Price CJ 
2000). This nonselectivity to word forms is also sup-
ported by several meta-analysis reviews showing that the 
AG was not consistently activated in single word reading 
in skilled adult readers (Fiez and Petersen 1998; Purcell 
and others 2011; Turkeltaub and others 2002). As dis-
cussed below in the next paragraph, this absence of activ-
ity for words relative to fixation might be explained by 
the strong task-independent deactivation that is typically 
seen in bilateral AG. This deactivation relative to fixation 
and rest has been attributed to greater semantic associations 
during free thought than during reading (Binder and oth-
ers 1999). A semantic account of the AG during reading 
was also supported by the strong positive correlation 
between activation in bilateral AG and both word fre-
quency and imageability (Binder and others 2005; Graves 
and others 2010). However, Graves and others (2010) 
argued that the AG is not involved in mapping from 
semantics to phonology, a role attributed to middle and 
inferior temporal gyri, but it is likely to support seman-
tic feature knowledge (Graves and others 2010). Thus, 
what emerges from this large literature is that the AG 
engages in reading when semantic associations are 
made (Price CJ and Mechelli 2005), an involvement 
that is particularly enhanced during sentence reading 
and more generally in comprehension of speech and 
written language (Obleser and Kotz 2010; Xu and oth-
ers 2005). In addition to this dominant semantic account 
in comprehension, it is worth noting the potential role 
of the AG in phoneme discrimination in sublexical 
speech perception (see meta-analysis in Turkeltaub and 
Coslett 2010).
The Default Network
The “default network” or the “default mode network” 
(Greicius and others 2003; Raichle and others 2001) des-
ignates a set of brain regions that are strongly deactivated 
during goal-directed tasks as compared with rest or pas-
sive baselines. It is thought to participate in internal 
mentation that becomes prominent when people are not 
engaged in external interactions (Buckner and others 
2008), and it forms one of the most consistent resting-
state networks (Smith and others 2009). These task-
independent deactivations include specifically the 
bilateral inferior parietal, medial frontal, and posterior 
cingulate cortex. The deactivation in the inferior parietal 
cortex that includes the bilateral AG is remarkably reli-
able (Shehzad and others 2009) and consistent across 
different tasks, paradigms, subjects, and studies (see 
recent meta-analysis reviews in Buckner and others 
2008; Laird and others 2009; Spreng and others 2009). 
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain 
such consistent deactivations in the AG. One influential 
hypothesis suggests that the AG is involved in task-free 
semantic and conceptual processes that result from the 
manipulation of acquired knowledge about the world 
during rest that is interrupted during effortful tasks 
(Binder and others 1999; see also Seghier and others 
2010; Wirth and others 2011). Others have suggested that 
the bilateral AG act as dynamic self-referential regions 
during rest that are associated with significant behavioral 
profiles in interoception and somesthesis (Laird and oth-
ers 2009). Alternatively, the AG might be engaged in 
constructing mental scenes based on memory during rest 
or when subjects envision themselves in the future 
(Andrews-Hanna and others 2010). To summarize this 
paragraph, the common denominator between these dif-
ferent hypotheses is the engagement of the AG in the 
manipulation of conceptual knowledge and mental repre-
sentations when the mind wanders during “rest.”
Number Processing
Early neuroimaging studies have shown strong AG acti-
vation during digit subtraction (Roland and Friberg 
1985) that has been replicated with high consistency 
across functional studies with varieties of tasks that 
manipulated different numerical operations and presenta-
tions (for review, see Dehaene and others 1998; Dehaene 
and others 2003). For instance, the AG has been shown 
to mediate spatial representations of numbers (Gobel and 
others 2001) and might be specific to Arabic digit percep-
tion even under passive tasks (Price GR and Ansari 
2011); however, its specificity for numbers is still debat-
able. For example, bilateral AG were activated during a 
conceptual decision on numbers, but this activation was 
similar to conceptual decisions on object names in the 
left AG (Cappelletti and others 2010), which argues 
against a selective role of the left AG for number process-
ing (e.g., Cappelletti and others 2007). In this context, 
Dehaene and others (2003) argued that the left AG is 
mainly involved in the verbal coding of numbers because 
it was strongly activated during small problems of addi-
tion and multiplication that require the retrieval of arith-
metic facts stored in the verbal memory. For example, by 
comparing problem solving of small versus large prob-
lems over different arithmetic operations, a significant 
difference was found in the left AG (Grabner and others 
2009), which supports its role in arithmetic fact retrieval. 
Interestingly, the left AG seems also to play a major role 
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during the transfer of facts between arithmetic operations 
(Ischebeck and others 2009). Although the left AG has 
dominated the number-processing field, activations in the 
right AG have not been infrequent. For instance, in a 
recent meta-analysis, the right AG has been shown to be 
a highly consistent cluster that is most likely to be 
involved in visual-spatial attention when calculation 
problems are being solved (Arsalidou and Taylor 2011).
Attention and Spatial Cognition
Several functional neuroimaging studies have suggested 
strong AG involvement in attention mechanisms (see 
review in Corbetta and Shulman 1998; Singh-Curry and 
Husain 2009). In particular, the AG might be involved in 
the reorienting or shifting of attention—for instance, 
when shifting the attentional system toward particular 
stimuli that have high salience in terms of motion, emo-
tion, value, or meaning (Gottlieb 2007). For example, it 
has been shown that attentional reorienting originates in 
the right AG thanks to its causal role in using task history 
to update attentional selection (Taylor and others 2011). 
The right inferior parietal lobule including the AG may 
also play an important role in maintaining attention as 
well as encoding salient events in the environment 
(Singh-Curry and Husain 2009). Furthermore, in their 
recent meta-analysis about the attention and memory 
systems, Ciaramelli and others (2008) argued that the 
inferior parietal cortex, including the supramarginal 
gyrus and the AG, is part of a “bottom-up” attentional 
subsystem that mediates the automatic allocation of 
attention to task-relevant information (Ciaramelli and 
others 2008), particularly in attending to retrieved memo-
ries (Cabeza and others 2008).
It is interesting to note that the bilateral AG are 
involved in a wide range of tasks in spatial cognition, 
which reflects our ability to process and integrate all 
spatial aspects of our environment, including the spatial 
analysis of external sensory information and internal 
mental representations (for review, see Sack 2009). One 
common example of such spatial cognition processes is 
the ability to discriminate left from right. This left-right 
discrimination consists first of a perceptual or spatial 
encoding process and then the ability to associate each 
side with the word left or right. As shown recently, the 
left AG is the site where spatial information is integrated 
with the meaning of the words left and right (Hirnstein 
and others 2011). Interestingly, the important support-
ing role of the AG in spatial cognition, particularly in 
the right hemisphere, explains why the AG is critical for 
perceptual learning (see discussion in Rosenthal and 
others 2009). This again highlights the major role of the 
AG in integrating spatial information with conceptual 
knowledge.
Memory Retrieval
The AG is associated with verbal working memory, 
particularly during the retrieval of verbal material 
(Jonides and others 1998). Recent meta-analysis reviews 
have demonstrated a strong involvement of the AG dur-
ing episodic memory retrieval, particularly during suc-
cessful (Ciaramelli and others 2008; Vilberg and Rugg 
2008) and subjective recollection (Spaniol and others 
2009). In addition, bilateral AG, as part of the inferior 
parietal lobule mediating the automatic “bottom-up” 
attentional resources (Cabeza and others 2008), play a 
critical role in monitoring the retrieval output continu-
ously, with an activation level that increases when 
memory performance is high and when recognizing 
items with high compared with low confidence (Cabeza 
2008; Ciaramelli and others 2008). However, others 
have argued that attention and memory can take distinct 
forms in the posterior parietal cortex, with the contribu-
tion of attention to memory varying between the left 
and right AG, and may differ between episodic encod-
ing and retrieval (Hutchinson and others 2009). 
Moreover, AG activity has also been shown to act as a 
marker of violations in memory expectations, where a 
violation reflects a lack of correspondence between 
retrieval outcomes and expectations (O’Connor and 
others 2010). Others have alternatively suggested that 
the AG, particularly in the left hemisphere, serves as a 
memory buffer for intention maintenance that sustains 
episodic information until the execution of an action 
(e.g., Kalpouzos and others 2010). Another set of evi-
dence is provided by studies that compared AG involve-
ment in episodic memory with the default network (e.g., 
see meta-analysis in Kim 2010). For instance, Sestieri 
and others (2011) compared the activation profile of the 
default network during episodic memory retrieval and 
found that the strongest memory search–related activa-
tions were observed in the bilateral AG (Sestieri and 
others 2011). Last but not least, the AG is also part of 
the autobiographical memory system (Spreng and oth-
ers 2009; Svoboda and others 2006). It is worth noting 
that the important role of the AG in memory is facili-
tated by its strong connectivity with the hippocampal 
system as mentioned above (i.e., Fig. 2).
Conflict Resolution
This concerns a broad range of tasks where participants 
need to select or execute an appropriate response in the 
context of conflict or interference from other conditions 
or stimuli. This conflict can be semantic, spatial, or emo-
tional in nature (see examples in Fan and others 2003). 
One particular class of conflict tasks that strongly acti-
vated the AG are go/no-go tasks that present participants 
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with two types of stimuli, one requiring a response and the 
other requiring the withholding of a response. Specifically, 
the right AG was found to be strongly involved during the 
inhibition of the inappropriate response across a variety of 
go/no-go tasks (see meta-analysis reviews in Nee and oth-
ers 2007; Wager and others 2005). Regarding the left AG, 
previous meta-analysis reviews failed to identify consis-
tent activations across neuroimaging studies that used dif-
ferent conflict tasks. One possible hypothesis is the need 
for a strong contextual/semantic conflict to activate the left 
AG. For instance, when comparing between three different 
conflict tasks, the right AG was strongly activated in all 
conflict tasks, whereas the left AG was only involved in a 
sentence comprehension task that included a conflict 
between plausible and implausible sentential representa-
tions (Ye and Zhou 2009). In the same way, when manipu-
lating semantic and referential anomalies during sentence 
comprehension, the right and left AG were strongly 
involved in solving referential ambiguity (Nieuwland and 
others 2007).
Theory-of-Mind and Social Cognition
Theory-of-mind or mentalizing is a framework used in 
social cognition to infer the mental states of others (i.e., 
the attribution of mental states) at the level of their 
beliefs, emotions, goals, and motivations. It is an essen-
tial capacity that helps the human brain to reason about 
other people to effectively communicate and navigate in 
the social world. Theory-of-mind tasks can be verbal or 
nonverbal in nature and typically involve false belief 
stories, attribution of mental state to one or more char-
acters of a story, cartoon stories, or animations of rigid 
geometric shapes that depict social interactions (e.g., 
Gallagher and others 2000). In this large literature of 
social cognition, a consistently activated region extended 
over posterior temporal to posterior parietal cortices 
(Decety and Lamm 2007), including the AG (Mar 2011). 
For instance, numerous functional neuroimaging studies 
have shown strong involvement of bilateral AG in the-
ory-of-mind or mentalizing tasks (see meta-analysis 
reviews in Buckner and others 2008; Mar 2011; Spreng 
and others 2009). As shown recently, bilateral AG 
showed strong involvement in both (verbal) story-based 
and (nonverbal) non-story-based theory-of-mind tasks, 
which may suggest its involvement in some aspects of 
sequencing and scene construction (see discussion in 
Mar 2011). Alternatively, other studies have suggested 
a role of bilateral AG in theory-of-mind in accessing 
story content and episodic memories (Calarge and oth-
ers 2003), in external-agency attribution (Sperduti and 
others 2011), or when inferences about human intention 
are made during discourse processing (Mason and Just 
2011). In sum, the AG in social cognition seems to 
support access to mental representations and judgment 
making on contextual associations.
AG as a Cross-Modal Integrative Hub
It is striking to see the high similarity in task-free deacti-
vation in the AG as in the default network with multiple 
networks that, in addition to the ones cited above, also 
included other high-order (meta-cognitive) systems such 
as envisioning the future, moral decision making, and 
prospection (Buckner and others 2008; Spreng and others 
2009). Given this high similarity, it might be more infor-
mative to think of the AG beyond the boundaries of each 
domain. This short paragraph thus aims to provide a uni-
fied picture of AG function that transcends specific 
domains or tasks. For instance, as argued by Binder and 
others (2009), the AG may play a particular role in all 
tasks requiring fluent conceptual combination, such as 
sentence comprehension, discourse, problem solving, 
and planning (Binder and others 2009). In another model, 
the AG was proposed as a module of an analyzing block 
responsible for accessing subparts of stored items 
(Shalom and Poeppel 2008). But before discussing spe-
cifically the fundamental features that may define AG 
function, it is useful to see how the AG was portrayed in 
some previous seminal studies.
By thoroughly reviewing earlier neuropsychological 
and comparative studies, Geschwind (1965) argued that 
intermodal associations become powerful in humans thanks 
in part to the emergence of the AG, which acts as a “visual 
memory centre for words” and has contributed tremen-
dously to the development of language and speech. Thirty 
years ago, Joseph (1982) defined the AG with Broca and 
Wernicke areas as components of a language axis that, with 
its complex interactions with the thalamic system, enables 
the formulation of speech and thought. Specifically, he pro-
posed that the AG is “involved in the assimilation of diverse 
information variables, their integration, the calling-up of 
relevant associations, and functions as a necessary interme-
diary for all conscious functioning, particularly in the 
development and comprehension of language and thought. 
. . . [The AG] increases the capacity for the organization, 
categorization, and labeling of sensory-motor events” 
(Joseph 1982, p. 22). He then defined the AG as a process-
ing center “where cross-modal associations such as visual, 
somasthetic and other sensory-motor concommitants are 
aroused, integrated, organized, assimilated, and finally 
comprehended” (Joseph 1982, p. 24). In addition, in his 
generalized model of sensation-to-cognition, Mesulam 
(1998) suggested that transmodal areas that include the pos-
terior parietal cortex “provide critical gateways for trans-
forming perception into recognition, word-forms into 
meaning, scenes and events into experiences, and spatial 
locations into targets for exploration.” In particular, thanks 
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to its role in multimodal associations, the posterior parietal 
cortex (including the AG) also supports spatial awareness 
and working memory–executive function (Mesulam 1998).
Furthermore, Damasio (1989) introduced the concept 
of a convergence zone to describe the function of the pos-
terior parietal cortex (including the AG) and other regions 
at the system level. Convergence zones are assumed to be 
amodal, and they sustain integration in a multimodal sys-
tem (Damasio 1989). They are purposely considered “a 
critical gateway for accessing, binding and integrating 
information related to the conceptual representation and 
exploration of the extrapersonal space. . . . They register 
combinations of components in terms of coincidence or 
sequence, in space and time” (Damasio 1989). This 
framework has recently been adapted by Binder and 
Desai (2011), who proposed that the AG belongs to the 
convergence zones that store increasingly abstract repre-
sentations of entity and event knowledge. They pointed 
out that the level of activation in the AG reflects the 
amount of semantic information that can be successfully 
retrieved from a given input, which suggests that the AG 
may play a unique role in the representation of event con-
cepts (Binder and Desai 2011).
Fortunately, these models seem to agree on some fun-
damental features that shape AG function. These features 
include cross-modal associations (or, in Damasio’s 
model, trimodal combinations), integration, meaning, 
and event representations. Given also the consistent 
involvement of the AG in the default network, memory 
retrieval, and spatial and social cognition, it is important 
to reckon other extra features that include the sense of 
agency and action awareness (Farrer and others 2008; 
Farrer and Frith 2002; Kim 2010; Sperduti and others 
2011). These extra features of agency and action aware-
ness complete the set of key features that embody the 
multiple roles of the AG because both seem necessary to 
accurately compass the dynamic nature of semantics (i.e., 
as events and experiences) where persons, concepts, 
objects, and actions bind in time and space (Zhuge 2010).
To conclude this paragraph, it becomes clear that the AG 
resembles a “core facility” used by different subsystems to 
access concepts when interfacing perception-to-recogni-
tion-to-action. More specifically, given its rich connectivity 
and its location where multisensory information converges, 
the AG resembles a cross-modal integrative hub that gives 
sense and meaning to an event within a contextualized envi-
ronment, based on prior expectations and knowledge, and 
toward an intended action. Although integration and amo-
dality have been associated with more anterior temporal 
regions (see reviews in Jung-Beeman 2005; Patterson and 
others 2007; Stowe and others 2005), it is plausible that the 
AG supports initial (or first-order) integration that provides 
direct access to conceptual representations. This is sup-
ported by recent evidence that showed, for instance, the 
involvement of the AG in audiovisual speech integration 
(Bernstein and others 2008) and face-voice integration dur-
ing person recognition (Joassin and others 2011). However, 
this does not preclude strong interactivity between the AG 
and other integrative hubs (Patterson and others 2007) that 
may increase with task demands (e.g., Obleser and others 
2007).
A Unified Account of AG Multiple Functions
Figure 3 schematically illustrates a unified framework that 
could account for the different processes/domains that 
activate the AG as detailed above. This framework is bor-
rowed from the popular predictive coding framework (as 
reviewed in Friston 2010) that models the brain as a hier-
archical inference engine that is trying to optimize proba-
bilistic representations of what caused its sensory input. 
Specifically, Figure 3A assumes the AG as an interface 
between the converging bottom-up multisensory inputs 
and the top-down predictions. Top-down predictions are 
conveyed by backward connections and are compared 
with the representations being generated at the AG, with 
the difference between the two reflecting the prediction 
error. This prediction error is then forwarded to higher 
levels to adjust and optimize the predictions. The recurrent 
exchange of bottom-up prediction errors and top-down 
predictions proceeds until prediction error is minimized at 
all levels of the system. Thus, the cross-modal integration 
in the AG can conceptually be seen as the sum of such 
recurrent exchange that happens at the level of the AG. 
The top-down predictions are based on previous knowl-
edge of the external world, similar learned experiences that 
can be retrieved, and the awareness of own action (sense 
of agency). They may also come from other subsystems 
that maintain the intention (i.e., the planned action/deci-
sion to be made) and the saliency and the priority given to 
particular events of interest. The core processes that result 
from such integration within the AG translate into the cat-
egorization of events, access to semantics, fact retrieval, 
and shifting attention toward relevant information.
This framework can explain the multiple functions 
that implicate the AG. For instance, access to semantics is 
a key process in language comprehension and sentence 
reading. Likewise, fact retrieval reflects the retrieval of 
learned rules and facts that are important in number pro-
cessing and in print-to-sound conversion during reading. 
Categorization of events and shifting attention to relevant 
information are important in social cognition, memory, 
and spatial cognition. In the case of the default network, 
the manipulation of conceptual knowledge, the sense of 
agency, and the retrieval of previous experiences (as pre-
dictions in Figure 3A) can modulate AG activity even in 
the absence of external sensory inputs. These processes 
are likely to have a hemispheric bias favoring more the 
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left than the right hemisphere or vice versa; for instance, 
attention might lateralize toward the right AG and seman-
tic access might lateralize toward the left AG. Critically, 
it is important to keep in mind that the exact role of the 
AG depends on the set of regions it is interacting with 
during a given task/process, as illustrated in Figure 3B. 
All these issues warrant further investigations.
Multiple Subdivisions
In the section above, the AG was assumed so far as one 
single region with homogeneous anatomical and functional 
properties, thus ignoring the large variability across studies 
in the localization of AG activations. For instance, in a 
previous meta-analysis of semantic processing, Binder and 
Figure 3. (A) Provides a unified framework that could account for the multiple functions of the angular gyrus (AG). Converging 
multisensory inputs are integrated in the AG (green box) in a context-dependent fashion. Top-down predictions (blue box) 
shape the integration of the converging inputs, and these predictions are generated on the basis of prior knowledge about the 
external world, similar learned experiences that can be retrieved, and the attribution of own action (i.e., the sense of agency). 
Other top-down predictions may come from other subsystems that code intention, saliency, and priority given to specific 
targets or events of interest. The integration in the AG proceeds via the recurrent exchange of bottom-up prediction errors 
(red arrows) and top-down predictions (blue arrows) until prediction error is minimized in the sense of the predictive coding 
framework (Friston 2010). This integration ultimately contributes in comprehending and reasoning about external events or 
internal mental representations and results in a set of core processes (orange box) that include events categorization, semantic 
access, fact retrieval, and shifting attention to relevant information. (B) Schematically illustrates the complex interplay between the 
AG and other distributed subsystems. It shows the convergence of different multimodel inputs to the AG (red arrows) and the 
interactions with different subsystems (orange arrows) that include memory, attention, action, and semantics. Interactions with 
other potential subsystems are indicated with blue arrows. The definition of semantic combinations and constraints is based on 
Price’s (2010) review, and the role of anterior temporal regions in semantic integration is based on Jung-Beeman’s (2005) review. 
Candidate regions that may strongly interact with the AG are listed with the most likely function/domain of interest. This is an 
oversimplified illustration because each domain/system contains several regions that can differently interact with the AG.
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others (2009) showed a wide distribution of activated 
peaks across 120 functional studies in bilateral AG (see 
Figure 2 in Binder and others 2009). Consistent AG peaks 
across multiple reviews have been considerably variable, 
as illustrated here in Table 1. This large variability in the 
AG may potentially reflect the existence of multiple sub-
divisions within the AG. Indeed, an increasing literature 
has defined the AG as an aggregate of multiple subdivi-
sions where each subdivision can be characterized by 
specific functional and connectivity patterns (e.g., 
Andrews-Hanna and others 2010; Bahnemann and others 
2010; Brownsett and Wise 2010; Caspers and others 2008; 
Eidelberg and Galaburda 1984; Kim 2010; Mars and oth-
ers 2011; Naidich and others 1995; Nelson and others 
2010; Nickel and Seitz 2005; Price GR and Ansari 2011; 
Rushworth and others 2006; Seghier and others 2010; 
Seghier and Price 2009; Sharp and others 2010; Uddin and 
others 2010; Vandenberghe and Gillebert 2009; Yeo and 
others 2011). This literature has provided an interesting 
framework for reporting and interpreting AG activations 
with greater definition, where each subdivision is allowed 
to have distinct contributions in a given task. This litera-
ture is briefly presented below with emphasis on anatomi-
cal, connectivity, or functional parcellation.
Anatomy-Based Parcellation
Previous neuroimaging studies have suggested a possible 
anatomical segregation of the AG according to the ana-
tomical variability in the sulci and gyri around the poste-
rior inferior parietal region. For instance, following a 
detailed anatomical analysis of the variability in the horse-
shoe shape of the angular gyrus, it was suggested that an 
additional accessory pre-angular (pre-AG) area can be 
reliably defined at the anterior part of the angular sulcus 
(Naidich and others 1995). In addition, Eidelberg and 
Galaburda (1984) suggested three possible subareas in the 
AG using cytoarchitectonic parcellation on 8 postmortem 
brains (Eidelberg and Galaburda 1984). Recently, using an 
observer-independent cytoarchitectonic analysis on 10 
postmortem brains, two cytoarchitectonic subdivisions 
were traced and labeled as areas PGa and PGp with high 
consistency across subjects (Caspers and others 2008; 
Caspers and others 2006) (see Fig. 1C). This recent ana-
tomical parcellation into PGa and PGp is now widely used 
in both connectivity and functional region-based analysis.
Connectivity-Based Parcellation
Using diffusion tensor imaging, different structural con-
nectivity patterns were observed at different parts of the 
AG. For instance, tractography-based parcellation of the 
inferior parietal lobule identified five clusters that 
included two subdivisions within the AG (Mars and oth-
ers 2011): a first cluster in the posterior-ventral part of 
the AG and a second cluster in the anterior-dorsal part of 
the AG. These two clusters resembled, respectively, the 
cytoarchitectonic subdivisions PGp and PGa shown in 
Figure 1C. Using resting-state functional connectivity 
analysis, it has been suggested that the posterior-ventral 
subdivision of the AG connects to the parahippocampal 
gyrus, whereas the anterior-dorsal subdivision of the AG 
connects more strongly with the anterior prefrontal cor-
tex (Mars and others 2011). Similarly, a direct compari-
son between the resting-state functional connectivity 
patterns of seed regions PGa and PGp revealed greater 
connectivity for PGa with the caudate, bilateral frontal 
poles, and posterior and anterior cingulate, as well as 
greater connectivity for PGp with the hippocampus, para-
hippocampal gyrus, medial prefrontal cortex, and precu-
neus (Uddin and others 2010). Although tractography from 
both subdivisions PGp and PGa showed strong connectiv-
ity with the caudate, there was stronger structural connec-
tivity from PGp than PGa with the hippocampus and the 
parahippocampal gyrus (Uddin and others 2010).
Function-Based Parcellation
Some recent functional neuroimaging studies have 
reported different contributions of distinct parts of the 
AG over variable tasks and processes. This was, in par-
ticular, shown in the left AG. For instance, Nelson and 
others (2010) used a combined analysis on the profile of 
memory retrieval–related activity and the membership to 
large-scale brain networks to dissociate six subregions in 
the lateral parietal cortex. Two subdivisions were located 
near the AG: a ventral region where activity correlated 
with that in the medial prefrontal cortex and a dorsal 
region where activity strongly correlated with that in the 
superior frontal gyrus (Nelson and others 2010). Using 
passive perception of letters and Arabic digits, the left 
AG was also segregated into a dorsal subdivision that 
was activated by both familiar letters and digits and a 
ventral subdivision that was strongly activated for digits 
compared with letters (Price GR and Ansari 2011).
During speech comprehension, two AG clusters were 
segregated by manipulating the semantic and acoustic 
difficulty in a task that required making decisions based 
on the semantic relatedness between heard nouns (Sharp 
and others 2010). A first ventral posterior AG cluster 
showed stronger activation for high semantic versus 
high acoustic difficult conditions, whereas a dorsal ante-
rior AG cluster showed stronger activation for high 
semantic versus control speech (Sharp and others 2010). 
Using similar semantic decision tasks but on written 
words and pictures of familiar objects, Seghier and oth-
ers (2010) showed a reliable intersection between the 
semantic network and the default network at a precise 
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AG location that served as a functional landmark to dis-
sociate three subdivisions in the left AG (Seghier and 
others 2010). A first subdivision, located at the site of 
the overlap between the two networks, is involved in 
semantic associations regardless of the presence or 
absence of a stimulus; dorsal to the overlap is a second 
subdivision involved in searching for semantics in all 
visual stimuli; and ventral to the overlap is a third sub-
division involved in the conceptual identification of 
visual inputs (Seghier and others 2010). On the other 
hand, evidence for similar subdivisions in the right AG 
is scarce, although one study of number processing dis-
sociated two ventral and dorsal clusters in the right AG 
that varied in activation level with number selectivity, 
response time-related effects, and stimulus-independent 
task effects (Cappelletti and others 2010).
Figure 4 illustrates the projection of the coordinates of 
the different left AG subdivisions identified in the four 
functional neuroimaging studies cited above (cf. Nelson 
and others 2010; Price GR and Ansari 2011; Seghier and 
others 2010; Sharp and others 2010), as reported in the 
standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. By 
grouping these MNI coordinates and looking for consis-
tent localizations, two AG subdivisions can clearly be 
identified (Fig. 4): 1) a first subdivision that is located dor-
sally in the AG with mean coordinates at [x = –35, y = –64, 
z = 45] and 2) a second subdivision located ventrally in the 
AG with mean coordinates at [x = –42, y = –69, z = 31]. 
More specifically, dorsal AG subdivision is likely to par-
ticipate in “bottom-up” processes during semantic search 
(Price CJ 2010; Seghier and others 2010), fact retrieval 
(e.g., Ischebeck and others 2009), and the (automatic) 
allocation of attention to memory (Cabeza and others 
2008; Ciaramelli and others 2008), whereas ventral AG 
subdivision may exert a “top-down” influence in self-ref-
erential processing (Kim 2010), providing semantic con-
straints (Price CJ 2010; Seghier and others 2010), and 
making judgments on mental representations (e.g., 
Bahnemann and others 2010; Mar 2011). The dorsal sub-
division is bounded by the lateral bank of the intraparietal 
sulcus, and the ventral subdivision most likely overlaps 
with the deactivated regions of the default network. It is 
worth noting that a third subdivision, located more ven-
trally at MNI–z coordinates of z = +20 mm, was also iden-
tified by Seghier and others (2010), as illustrated in 
magenta in Figure 4. This third ventral AG subdivision 
showed stronger semantic responses when stimuli were 
pictures than written words, suggesting its role in direct 
access to concepts from visual inputs (Seghier and others 
2010). Similarly, during social cognition tasks, Bahnemann 
and others (2010) observed a strong overlap between the-
ory-of-mind tasks and moral judgment tasks at this more 
Figure 4. Projection of Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates of previous angular gyrus (AG) subdivisions on a 
schematic sagittal outline (left, at x = –30 mm) and a zoom centered at the AG (right). A = Seghier and others (2010), B = Nelson 
and others (2010), C = Price GR and Ansari (2011), and D = Sharp and others (2010). Dorsal coordinates are shown in blue and 
ventral coordinates are shown in red. A third more ventral subdivision at z = +20 mm is shown in magenta (according to Seghier 
and others 2010). Average locations are illustrated with a star (blue for dorsal subdivision at [x = –35, y = –64, z = 45], red for 
ventral subdivision at [x = –42, y = –69, z = 31]). The average locations here are remarkably similar to the two subdivisions used in 
a recent seed-based resting-state functional connectivity study over a large sample of 1000 subjects (noted as PGpd and PGpv in 
Table 4 and Figure 30 of Yeo and others 2011). Approximate location of the center of gravity of cytoarchitectonic areas PGa and 
PGp (Caspers and others 2008) is indicated by “+” in blue and red, respectively. BA = Brodmann area.
 at University College London on August 4, 2014nro.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
56  The Neuroscientist 19(1)
ventral AG subdivision that was distinct from other dorsal 
AG responses.
To conclude this section, both anatomical and func-
tional evidence supports the existence of a high-definition 
map in the AG. This is particularly visible along the ven-
tral-to-dorsal axis in the left AG, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
Future studies can use this spatial parcellation of the AG 
as a roadmap to report their activations.
Future Work
The studies reviewed here have provided valuable 
insights to our understanding of the exact contribution of 
the AG in cognition. Several other issues warrant further 
investigations, as briefly listed below:
Identify the set of core regions that interact with the AG in 
different processes and how these interactions are modulated 
by task demands (as illustrated in Fig. 3B). This important 
issue would benefit from the popularization of effective 
connectivity techniques that allow the direction and 
strength of interregional coupling to be estimated. For 
instance, Carreiras and others (2009) demonstrated a “top-
down” role of the AG on posterior occipital areas during 
reading aloud relative to object naming (Carreiras and 
others 2009). Similar studies are thus needed to depict a 
mechanistic account for AG role(s). A particularly inter-
esting question is the nature of interactions that the AG 
carries with the rest of the semantic network. The seman-
tic system is composed of a large set of nodes (Binder and 
others 2009) that may play different roles in semantic pro-
cesses, including the pars orbitalis, the middle temporal 
gyrus, and the temporal pole (for more details, see Price 
CJ 2010). Moreover, there is a lack of literature regarding 
the potential interactions between the AG and cerebellar 
regions, particularly when considering the contribution of 
the cerebellum to different cognitive processes (Schmah-
mann 2010). For instance, a recent resting-state connec-
tivity analysis has revealed strong functional connectivity 
between the posterior parietal cortex (including the AG) 
and a supramodale zone of the cerebellum (see O’Reilly 
and others 2010).
Visualize the dynamics of AG activation using high-temporal 
resolution techniques. In this brief review, it was not pos-
sible to do justice to previous electroencephalogram, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation, or magnetoencephalo-
gram studies because this literature requires its own 
review. For example, these techniques can help to reveal 
whether AG activation happens at earlier or later latency 
than frontal and temporal regions and whether this latency 
changes with task demands and modality.
Characterize lateralization in the AG and how it is modu-
lated by task and modality. This issue relates to the possible 
differences in functional properties in the left and right 
AG over varieties of tasks (Jung-Beeman 2005; Lindell 
2006). For instance, as shown above, the involvement of 
the AG for semantics, spatial cognition, or number pro-
cessing may vary between left and right hemispheres. A 
systematic analysis of lateralization effects in the AG will 
provide important clues for future models of AG func-
tion. In the same way, the different AG subdivisions 
shown above are mainly identified in the left hemisphere. 
Future studies are needed to investigate whether the same 
functional subdivisions exist in the right AG.
Characterize specific deficits associated with AG damage. 
It has been shown that damage to the AG has conse-
quences on a range of skills, including speech compre-
hension, finger agnosia, spatial disorientation, acalculia, 
agraphia, and dementia (e.g., Ardila and others 2000; 
Corbett and others 2009). The wide range of deficits 
speaks volume to the multiple tasks and processes that 
depend on the integrity of the AG. Future work can report 
AG damage at high definition, as reviewed here, to iden-
tify whether these variable deficits may reflect damage to 
specific subparts of the AG.
Explore interindividual variability in AG function. There is 
an increasing interest in characterizing variability in 
function between subjects because it can reveal the differ-
ent cognitive strategies used by subjects when perform-
ing the same task (Miller and others 2012; Seghier and 
Price 2009). Developmental factors may also contribute 
to such variability, and thus studies are needed to test 
whether AG structure and function vary over the life 
span. For instance, it has been shown that the AG is one 
of the few brain regions where structural asymmetry 
decreases with age (Kovalev and others 2003). In the 
same context, the impact of other demographic (gender 
and handedness) and genetic variables on the anatomy 
and function of the AG warrants further studies.
Compare the size, location, and connectivity of the AG across 
different species. For instance, it has been shown that a major 
temporal lobe projection of the arcuate fasciculus in humans 
is smaller or even absent in chimpanzees and macaques 
(Rilling and others 2008). This topic warrants systematic 
investigation because it can provide new clues to explain 
the disproportionate expansion of the multimodal associa-
tive regions in humans and their significant contribution to 
our cognitive and linguistic abilities (see discussion in Rosa 
and Tweedale 2005; Sherwood and others 2008).
Conclusion
This brief review aimed to bring together previous findings 
to construct a unified picture of the AG during all processes, 
from perception to action. It highlights the integrative role 
of the AG in comprehension and reasoning—for instance, 
when manipulating conceptual knowledge, reorienting the 
attentional system toward relevant information, retrieving 
facts for problem solving, and giving meaning to external 
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events based on stored memories and prior experiences. 
This review also discussed the spatial fractation of the AG 
into multiple subdivisions that may contribute in “bottom-
up” and “top-down” mechanisms across numerous tasks. 
Future studies have to clarify how the AG communicates 
with other subsystems to continuously give meaning and 
sense to the external world. Finally, this highly selective 
review recognizes that cracking the code that uniquely 
defines AG function is still an ongoing endeavor.
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